Know the Theses

When you are in a trade, it is crucial to understand both sides of the trade. Both the Long/Bull thesis, and the Short/Bear thesis.

Every stock trades on supply and demand, and every new data point will drive both bulls & bears to – in aggregate – either buy more & cover or sell & short more.

When a company comes out with an 8-K disclosing a new contract which would double the company’s revenues, it’s obviously bullish & there isn’t much to think about. But when a company releases quarterly earnings, which is hardly ever unanimously positive or negative, there is almost always a certain margin number, a specific segment revenue trend, a CAPEX forecast etc. that some people are looking for. The key is to understand both the bull & bear theses and have the ability to dissect the PR, and find those key data points, as this will give you the ability to predict whether existing bulls will buy more, hold, or sell, and if existing bears will cover, stay short or short more.

A few recent examples.

$ZNGA

I shared my $ZNGA Long Thesis several months ago (at ~$2.30). If you read the post or know the thesis, it has nothing to do with revenue growth. It’s all about their cash (and real estate) balance – limiting their downside – and huge (via online gambling) upside optionality.

The biggest concern to the thesis of course is cash burn. From my perspective (as a $ZNGA long), I’d rather have lower revenues, as long as costs and cash burn come down faster, – it’s all about cash flow from operations, free cash flow, and building relationships for the future.

So when $ZNGA came out with earnings, I was thrilled. Yes, revenues beat expectations, but that wasn’t the point. It was all about the company being able to contain and lower their cost structure. (I was upset about the lack of real buybacks, because if their cash isn’t returned to shareholders – as huge as it is – it will get discounted by investors).

I did however see some tweets like these…

… and while i do understand that slowing revenues is the backbone of the bear thesis – so i guess it’s fine for bears to bring it up – it was definitely outweighed by the company’s cost reduction and hence the nice move on/after earnings.

$YHOO

I shared my $YHOO long thesis a couple of times (YHOO isn’t really Yahoo! & YHOO to $60.41?)… and anybody that follows me knows, this is all about SOTP (Sum Of The Parts). Yes, Marissa Mayer is boosting moral and gaining the faith of some to turn around the core US business, but even most bulls would agree that it is still going to be a hard & long road. Bears on the other hand, mainly focus on the long-tern struggles of the US core business, and speculate that the international assets are too illiquid and won’t be returned to shareholders even if monetized.

So when $YHOO came out with earnings that showed real advances in the US core business and the stock popped ~6% on the news, I was focusing on the lack of real updates/advances in the SOTP story, I tweeted that it was probably an easy fade, and followed up with this the next day…

… The stock closed down the following day, and over the next week drifted even lower before stabilizing on Y! Japan’s impressive earnings results. (SOTP FTW!)

By knowing what the bulls & bears were looking for, you would have known that the US core improvement wouldn’t help the stock much. On the flip side, an announcement of some type of monetizing of Y! Japan, or an Alibaba Group IPO – that would be something that would take the stock to the next level. (This is also one of the reasons – I believe – the $YHOO/$GOOG deal announced last night was mostly faded today.)

$GMCR

Last night’s release seemed (at first blush) to be very bullish – you had EPS & revenues beat, even guidance seemed fine, and the stock initially spike over $53. But if you followed #FF list‘s @firstadopter he right away tweeted the relevant data points – data that theses were built on…

… Within 10 minutes the stock fell >10 points (although recovered a bit today).

Bottom Line

Know what you’re invested in, why you’re invested in it, and what data point are important to that thesis.

- MicroFundy

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The Amazon Dilemma

Let me get this out of the way… I am an Amazon customer, they offer great prices, Prime, 2 day shipping etc. What’s not to like?

Let me also say that (since the late 90′s,) I have never invested or shorted $AMZN or $AMZN options. I do however – along with almost any value investor I have talked to about it – have a negative and bearish bias against it.

Why? Well, where to start? How about its TTM negative earnings? How about operating margins averaging around 1% the last four quarters? Should we talk about their free cash flow (or lack thereof)? Or maybe the quality of most of their cash flow (working capital, stock compensation)?

It’s not difficult to see why many investors have shorted and continue to short $AMZN.

For years, I thought $AMZN was a plain-vanilla “momentum” name. Meaning, as long as (earnings &) revenue growth came in ahead of expectations, people will overlook their nose bleed profit ratios, their low margins etc. and the stock would continue to rise.

But then last year the company missed revenue estimates multiple times. They even guided down revenue and profit estimates, and although the stock initially fell on a couple of these releases (trapping many shorts), it rebounded almost immediately and ended up huge the following day/week.

#FF list‘s @firstadopter tweeted a perfect summation yesterday…

A typical momentum name would have gotten smashed on these numbers.

After the second one of these quarters, I tweeted “Are there any fundamental investors who own this stock? And if yes, Why?”

For the most part the answer I have received is either something like “you have to forecast years ahead – the company will become tremendously profitable, all they need to do is turn off the spigot, and then margins will skyrocket.”

The thesis here, is that the company’s spending is voluntary and totally discretionary, and if the company wanted to, or better yet – completed its build-out, – margins and profits will explode higher.

The other answer I’ve received is that $AMZN’s value is all about its replacement value. I.E. – If another company wanted to duplicate what $AMZN has already built, it would cost billions & billions of dollars.

Let’s delve into both of these answers.

Forecast years ahead…

(I have previously written about $AAPL and how discount rates have to be higher the further out you go, AND the more uncertain their earnings are. (Please read the article, it turned out to be a key in this recent $AAPL pullback.))

I challenge anybody to look back at any of the last few years & read any DCF model of a bullish $AMZN analyst. See what they modeled for earnings & cash flows etc. for 2012, and then look what $AMZN reported.

With a company like Amazon that continues to spend to build and invest to earn, any & all earnings that are now being expected in the future must be discounted way more than your average retailer or eCommerce company.

Replacement Value…

The replacement value of a existing home vs. buying a new lot & building a new home makes a lot of sense. For collectibles (with no real replacements) it’s even more amplified. But how about something like the Egyptian Pyramids? I’m sure the cost of replacing them is tremendous, but if they’re not in demand (like art/other collectibles , and/or not producing any cash flows, who cares how much it would cost to replace it?

Obviously, what $AMZN built isn’t worthless, and it can (and most probably will) produce plenty of cash flows. But that’s the key… How much? When? When valuing a company, you need to figure out the amount of cash flows, and then discount them by an appropriate rate, and again – the higher the uncertainty the higher the discount rate = the less the future cash flows are worth today.

So to answer @biggercapital‘s tweet —

—because pushing back cash flows MAJORLY effect valuations. And this is even if they are certain to come – which in $AMZN’s case is far from certain.

Brick & mortar retailers aren’t staying pat (see $TGT price matching etc.), I also – importantly – do not subscribe to the thesis that the company can just “turn off” their spending. A huge portion of the company’s “extra” spending comes from Amazon selling Kindles at or below costs, losing money on shipping, giving more & more things (content costs for movies/music) to Prime users etc. All these costs are NECESSARY spending to build & keep alive their ecosystem. Without them they’re just another e-tailer fighting tooth & nail vs. tons of others.

So what’s the dilemma?

When I short (or buy puts on) a company like this, it’s normally right after it “cracks”. There’s typically an event when the momentum story breaks, the stock tanks 15-20% in one day, and while some people that missed the whole way up might go ahead and buy, thinking it will regain its pizzazz, and then boom – the stock continues to crater and eventually settles at much lower prices. Think $TASR/$TZOO in the end of ’04, $CROX in ’07, $GMCR in ’11 etc. All of these stocks “broke” at one point and settled at much lower prices over time, but from after the breaking point until the eventual settling range – that’s where it’s best to short these “momentum” stocks. The key is waiting until a “real” break – something that causes the story to change – the theme behind the momentum investors over-exuberant enthusiasm changes.

This should have happened in my opinion with Amazon last year, when revenue and earning growth missed & guided down. And herein lies the dilemma. If that did not break the stock, what will? According to almost all fundamental investors, the original momentum thesis is already broken, so now what should I look for? When can I short? If the stock pulls back $20 or $30 points, what changed? Would that be a real “break” or will it be yet another bear trap?

One thing I am pretty confident in, is that one day $AMZN will break, something will change and cause momentum guys to flee, and at that point it won’t stop at prices where typical growth investors want in, it won’t stop until it trades at such depressed levels that value guys will start scraping at it… and on most of that way down, I will partake, and do so with immense pleasure.

- MicroFundy

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A $RIMM BB10 Trade

I wrote about $RIMM when it was trading at $7.50 – Is RIMM cheap enough? – and opined that the stock had another $1.25 in downside. The stocked bottomed two months later at $6.22 and has over doubled since, to a current $14.74.

The basis of that call was all about the worst-case scenario – the company’s liquidation value. I did not – and still do not - think that the company will succeed in the long term.

Some people (some of whom I respect a lot) think that there will definitely end up being a third player in the mobile wars. $AAPL’s IOS & $GOOG’s Android currently control most of the smartphone market.

If you subscribed to that thesis, $MSFT would have been the easiest choice. Yet despite an operation system which most considered up to par (and in some cases even better than) Android & IOS, Windows Phone 8 has received very little traction.

I don’t think you can blame it on the hardware either, as some of $NOK’s phones are very comparable to the top line $AAPL and Android phones. $MSFT has also ramped up the amount of Apps, and have also invested tons of money in advertising to gain awareness and traction etc.

The obvious reason it hasn’t worked out for $MSFT (yet), is because they wanted and needed people to switch to a new & unproven operating system. There’s a bit of chicken/egg dilemma with regards to developers friends/ecosystem etc. There is also nothing pushing people away from their current “comfortable” phones.

So why would anybody assume $RIMM will succeed? They have a lot less money to burn than $MSFT. They have fewer partners. They have fewer unique add-ons like Skype & Xbox. Just like $MSFT, their reputation in the mobile space is shot. The only thing they have going for them is their existing user base, and this is something $MSFT did not have. But this is where I think people’s “hope” and “prayer” in BB10 is wrong. They’re relying on their existing user to upgrade from both their current phone (hardware), and from their current operating system, at one time. Why would they chose BB10?

Ask a current Blackberry Bold user why he/she has yet to switch to another phone. I’d wager that most either “need” their keyboard, or they don’t want/need a “computer” phone – they currently use and only want to use their phone for phone calls and emails. If they didn’t need the keyboard, and/or wanted a “real” smartphone, they would have already switched to Android/IOS years ago (with the rest of us).

We’re talking about an ecosystem here. It’s all about the apps, the connectivity of different programs and services. I think it’s extremely safe to assume that very few IOS or Android users will switch to BB10, and again I think any “old school” blackberry user would either stick with their own “comfort” phone, or make a move. Yes, BB10 is one of the options for that move but because we’re talking about a new OS, and a new phone (with most of the new phones without keyboards) it is only one of the options. It is not an automatically assumed upgrade like say upgrading to Android Ice Cream or IOS 6. If you had a prior version of an existing OS, the conversion to the newer OS is a very strong probability. The same goes on a typical hardware upgrade – say moving from an Android HTC to a Galaxy S3 (my recent phone upgrade) – the software was the same – the same OS, so while the hardware was an upgrade, it wasn’t a huge change. (Same with iPhone 4 to 4S/5.)

$RIMM is trying to get people to switch both. And we’re talking about a huge switch (at least I would hope so (for $RIMM’s sake)) – both on the software side and the hardware side. So why would current users go ( – and that’s the key word – they’re going to a new platform, not staying in the same place -) to an unknown, unproven, and assumed inferior OS?

Yes, there will be buyers of the new BB10 phones, but will it succeed to compete with IOS and Android? I highly doubt it. Will it gain enough subscribers to make it sustainable? I doubt this as well. Keeping in mind, without enough scale, developers wont come, and the entire platform eventually collapses.

How to trade it? Like #FF list‘s @herbgreenberg tweeted earlier today:

While impossible to time, I’m looking to purchase Put Spreads on the stock. Based on the company’s last filing, I think (based on my discounted fair value TBV) the downside is around $7.80.

A June 2013 $12/$10 Put Spread would cost around $0.71, but because of my TBV assumed floor of $8, I would sell an additional $8 Put to lower the cost to around $0.28 (you are “naked” on this second put, so the stock falling lower than $8 would have an adverse effect on the trade).

If the stock trades between $8 and $10 at expiration, you are at your max gain of $1.72 ($2 minus the $0.28 cost), and your break-even price is $11.72. You max loss on the upside (say if BB10 does take off and the stock triples to >$40) is $0.28, but on the downside, if the stock falls under $8 you can lose a lot. At $0 for example - your true max loss – you would lose $6.28.

This obviously is not a recommendation, and any Options trading should only be done by sophisticated investors etc.

UPDATE: (1/16/2013 10:15PM) – Full Disclosure: I have NOT put on this trade, and will be looking to enter into it (or something similar) sometime in the next week or two. Ideally, i would try to get the above Spread for zero cost, or even as a Credit spread.

UPDATE: (2/11/2013 2:30PM) – Here are the trades I executed in relation to this post…

- MicroFundy

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Follow Up On 2012′s Posts

As we turn to 2013, I wanted to thank all my Blog readers & visitors.

Below is a brief follow up on my first 39 posts.

It’s not Facebook! It’s the IPO Market! - Looking forward to 2013, I hope Twitter learned from $FB and goes public sooner rather than later.

The real Bull / Bear case on Apple, Inc. & iPhone 5: Apple’s inflection point - While I don’t have strong conviction in who is right, I remain convinced that these posts are spot-on to what the real $AAPL battle is.

What cash flows to “discount” when valuing an Equity? - Still see several reports where analysts/reporters make this obvious mistake.

Ignore the PE! - Such an important post. Tower companies are the perfect example. $AMT $CCI $SBAC continue to make new highs.

Hindsight is always 20/20 - “An investment’s end result, does not – on its own – confirm if it was a smart investment”.

YHOO isn’t really Yahoo! & YHOO to $60.41? - $YHOO SOTP analysis played out precisely as I hoped & expected. The stock is up from ~$15.50 at the time of the posts, to $20.08 currently.

Make sure you GET PAID! - “You need to be compensated for the risks that you are taking.” @biggercapital‘s $APP had a wild ride, going from ~.90 to a high of $1.70, now back at $1.13

Analyzing Annaly - $NLY went from $16.70 to a current $14.32, wiping out more than a year’s worth of dividends.

Is RIMM cheap enough? - $RIMM definitely was! I wrote that the stock had $1.25 downside at ~$7.50, and the stock hit a low of $6.22 a few months later. Since then, it almost doubled and now trades at $11.72.

Treasuries are bubbling - I still subscribe to this thesis.

Blue Chip Utilities = Red Portfolio? - $XLU went from ~$37 to a current $35.56 while the S&P 500 is up over 100 points in the same time-frame.

Open Letter to @JimCramer & Another Open Letter to @JimCramer - His “Am I diversified” segment continues to unnecessarily place innocent investors at risk.

Leave it to the Pros - Play your game.

QE Failed. & What QE3 means for your portfolio - These posts (which I originally wrote contradicted my Blue Chip Utilities = Red Portfolio? post), turned out to be wrong. The hunt for yield actually has subsided even with QE3, QE4, & QE5.

Groupon Goods… Good for revenues, not for profits. & Groupon: The New Overstock.com - $GRPN went from an original $5.80 (first post) to a low of $2.60 (YES, my second post bottom-ticked the stock!) and back to $4.96 today. I believe this is a terminal short, the business model – broken, and rallies should be faded/shorted.

Enron, Lehman Brothers, and… Netflix? & Netflix, meet Porter- $NFLX fell from ~$63 to $53 before rebounding to a current $92.01. Icahn, short covering, & a new $DIS contract all fueled the rally. I continue to believe competition & content costs (on AND off balance sheet) will crush the company.

The tail of two teams - The Orioles DID make the playoffs but lost (in 5 games) to the Yankees in the ALDS. The Cardinals meanwhile not only made the playoffs, they beat the Nationals in the NLDS & lost to the eventual WS champion Giants (in 7 games) in the NLDS.

Tweets of the week & Why I use Twitter - @Dasan@firstadopter & @given2tweet continue to be great follows, while @TA_Trader committed twitter-suicide, he is missed greatly.

Facebook killed the “Second Markets” - Have hardly heard about “SharesPost and SecondMarkets” since.

QE3 is a lock. - Little did we know QE4 & QE5 were only a few months away. #JellyDoughnuts FTW!

Sprint doubled! Meh. - Great lesson on Enterprise Value vs Market Cap.

Vodafone’s crown jewel - $VOD continues to underperform. It is one of my highest conviction long ideas for 2013 & beyond.

Gold’s Breaking Out! - While the charts did look great, thank goodness I’m not a full-time technician. $GC_F peaked a couple of weeks later at $1798 now trades at ~$110 points lower.

$RIMM’s Working Capital - $RIMM’s working capital did improve the next quarter and all eyes are on the BB10 launch this month. I think the next couple of weeks will provide a great short entry.

$ZNGA Long Thesis - $ZNGA went from $2.30 to as low as $2.09 and as high as $2.75. The stock closed today at $2.39. Again, the bull thesis is NOT a base case thesis. However, the Risk/Reward in my opinion is one of the best out there at these levels.

$MSFT $INTC Pairs Trade - $MSFT fell from $29.20 to a current $27.62, while $INTC is down only .20 to $21.38.

Pandora: Damned if they do, damned if they don’t. - $P is up from ~$8.50 to $9.45 (after hitting a low of $7.08 a few weeks after the post). $P is still stuck between a rock & a hard place imho.

Mobile Wars - $MSFT’s mobile strategy continues to baffle me.

Thanksgiving Reading - If you haven’t yet… great reads.

Buybacks vs Dividends - I really think CFOs & BODs should read this and consider…

10b5-1 plans and Insider “not” Trading - Insiders should sell & diversify their holdings. How & when are another matter.

Risk defined. - How to measure the Risk in “Risk vs Reward”.

Thanks again for reading. I hope I added value to you in 2012, and look forward to a great 2013!

- MicroFundy

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Risk defined.

Risk vs Reward has to be the single most important metric when it comes to investing.

If you only look at one side of the equation you will not getting the full picture.

Let’s first look at Returns. Who cares if you made 50% on your money in a single day, (say on some FDA approval,) if you had an equal chance of losing 50%? That’s called gambling. You could have just as easily gone to Vegas and bet on black. (In Vegas, at least you would get free drinks!)

The same goes with the Risk. You could take ZERO investment risk. Would that make you the best Risk Manager around? Money in the mattress, extremely short duration USTs, there are many places where if focused solely on the risks involved, you could achieve 100% success.

You obviously have to look at both things – together – as a whole. How much Risk am i taking for every level of Return?

The focus of this post will be on how to measure risk.

“Heat”

Yesterday, I had a twitter conversation with my good friend @Legacy_Trades about this very subject, and he followed up with this short article.
(Although I was somewhat offended by his donkey comment, (I think that was more than offset by adding Loeb in the sentence,) the article is – as always – concise & well written.)

To summarize, @Legacy_Trades firmly (to put it lightly) believes that Risk is defined by the amount of money (or %) you are actually down at any given time during the trade. In his tweets he calls it “Heat”. For example,  if you invest in ABC @ $10, and it hits a low of $9.50 and you end up selling at $13 – your Reward was $3 with $.50 of Risk or Heat. Said another way – 6:1 Reward vs Risk.

You can (for the most part (I’ll refer back to this later)) define your risk when you enter a trade by placing stop orders. Say you enter a trade with a target of 50% upside, you not only want to make sure that the Risk isn’t anywhere close to that upside percentage, you also place a stop loss order, so you would exit at that Risk level, and avoid taking more “heat”.

My disagreement with @Legacy_Trades is not that I think this is an inaccurate definition of Risk. It is accurate, extremely useful, and to me shows your “realized” Risk vs Reward.

My main point however is that there are other ways to define Risk as well.

“Volatility”

Without getting into to many quantitative details… A key ratio in judging returns (especially for Hedge Funds, because they supposedly try to hedge and minimize volatility) is called the Sharpe Ratio. The Sharpe Ratio is calculated by taking the Alpha – the Portfolio’s “extra” return over its Benchmark – and dividing it by the Standard Deviation of those returns. The higher the Ratio the better. Other similarly focused Ratios include Jensen’s Alpha & Treynor Ratio.

All of these Ratios have a Risk component and the purpose of the Ratio is to measure performance vs risk – REWARD vs RISK. But in these Ratios, risk is not measured in terms of  a Stop Loss, or Heat taken on the portfolio. (There are measures for that as well – drawdown or maximum drawdown are perfect examples.) Risk, in these cases are measured by the Volatility of the portfolio.

As I’ll talk about later, this measure of Risk is a lot more important when referring to an entire Portfolio’s Risks, but it is also an important measure for individual investments.

“Permanent Loss”

A third and in my opinion the most crucial way to define risk for long term investors, is Permanent Loss. This is especially true if you investing your own money and/or have investors that understand your strategy, and are willing to stomach volatility and/or heat. (I am not naive, there aren’t many of such investors, and if you know any, please have them contact me ;-) …)

Think about making an investment in a 10 year US Treasury Bond. (For this illustration, think about a “normal” fixed income era (not the last few years…)) As part of a complete portfolio, you purchase this bond because of its low correlation to rest of the portfolio. You also want the income (interest payments), and therefore plan on holding the Bond until it matures in 10 years.

In this case, is Volatility or Heat important? No. Who cares if the Bond (which say you purchased at Par) trades down to .80 or .90, or if it has swings of 5% back & forth during some volatile period? Your fundamental thesis was to purchase this bond, earn the X percentage (yield), hold it to maturity, and receive your principal back. The only Risks that were taken, was the tiny fraction of 1% chance that the US Govt would default, or (more likely) that you might get paid back with devalued dollars (inflation risk). If you plan on trading this Bond however, its Volatility, and the Heat are very important.

Also, say your return on this Bond is 4% annually, is it really a bad investment if during the 10 year holding there was Heat of say 15%? Would someone say that you took more risks than rewards received?

Imagine on the other hand, your 50%-50% FDA decision “investment” – the pure gamble - let’s say it never took any heat. Say you buy ABC pharma at $10, it never goes below your purchase price and then – boom –  you get the FDA approval and the stock is at $15. Would you say you had zero risk? lol! You might have had zero realized risk, but you had 50% of losing 1/2 your money!

And, guess what? You might have placed a Stop Loss Order at $9.95, for a “defined” risk of .05 vs the potential reward of $5… a great R:R, right? Whoops! FDA day comes, stock gets halted and opens at $5.

This is all about your approach & perspective.

Seth Klarman’s famous “Margin of Safety” clearly isn’t referring to Heat or Volatility.

The conversation started with $YHOO. To me, the Risk in $YHOO at the $14-$16 that it was trading at over the last year leading up to October, was very close to risk-less when you’re talking about an equity (especially in Tech/Media). Not because it didn’t fall much after I purchased it, (which it didn’t,) but because based on my fundamental research and understanding of the company, i felt there was very little chance of a Permanent Loss. I also felt that there was a pretty easily attainable upside – as I’ve written previously in this blog in the past that i thought we can get into the low 20′s.  That is my Risk vs Reward.

Imagine, prior to going up to $19, $YHOO fell back to its August 2011 lows (- the Loeb lows -)… Heat would be -~$5 and now at $19 we’re +~5, so from a heat perspective it would be horrible ~1:1 Risk-Reward. But from my perspective, an $11 stock price, would have been a gift, to where I could load up more – in the same “risk-less” idea. (In a Heat world, you would probably have been stopped out at a loss at ~$13.) One is trading, one is longer term investing.

Same goes with Volatility. i didn’t mind the many swings back and forth between $14 and $16, to the contrary, the stock had extremely low correlation during the year to the overall market – lowering my entire portfolio’s beta. On an isolated basis however, there were many 10-20% swings that if focusing purely on volatility, might have shaken you out.

Was there really zero Risk? No, of course not, there are risks with any investment, and in the case of $YHOO, the risk was my thesis. Maybe I was wrong. But the thesis’ Risk-Reward was great. This is why it’s so crucial to know the thesis behind an investment, and to watch the investment closely, looking for telltales saying your thesis is wrong etc. The thesis in this case though, told me that at the $14-$16 range there was little to no risk for a permanent loss with a clear path to 50% upside. That in my humble opinion is a nice Risk vs Reward proposition.

$ZNGA, similar to $YHOO has little Risk of Permanent Loss in my opinion. Cash burn could get worse, and then the thesis would have to be reevaluated, but at these levels the company is trading near cash + HQ value. The upside isn’t nearly as “base case” as $YHOO’s was, but the potential upside is much higher.

Conclusion:

When managing money for clients, it seems like everybody’s main focus is always on the Reward side of the equation. It is crucial however, to know what Risks are taken in order to achieve the Rewards. ALL RISKS.

On any given trade, you must know what your downside is, if you’re more short term oriented, more trader than investor – put stops, buy puts, enter a trade with a defined number that your willing to risk, and make sure you Reward target outnumbers that Risk level by a huge margin. If you’re a longer term investor, and don’t mind taking heat, (as long as there’s no Risk of Permanent Losses,) know what are the Risks to your thesis. Know how/what/why you might be wrong, and if those Risks appear to be gaining steam know your exit points as well. Volatility too, (even on an isolated investment,) know how volatile this investment has been and how its volatility compares to other holding in a given portfolio. In all cases, you can look at the “realized” risk by seeing the max drawdown (heat taken) on the investment.

From the perspective of a portfolio manager, Volatility of the entire portfolio becomes even more important. Overall, and especially compared to the portfolio’s Benchmark. It is also crucial to know the portfolio’s maximum drawdown.

I have learned so much from @Legacy_Trades over the last year or two. He posts real live trades, he posts size, entries, scale in prices, stop loss prices (& changes), price target objectives, scale out prices, and exits. Everything. He truly is one of a kind on Twitter and adds great value to my stream.

However, it is not the only “right” way. I have found & follow many value-add twitter people (I hope you find me in this camp as well) that posts ideas, thoughts, & themes that do not post buys, sells, or stops. To me the value here is more about theories, theses, & discussions.

Is one better than the other? Sure. I’m sure some people would find more value in actual trades, and I’m sure others would find value in ideas. I do not think one has to post a certain style to add value to a stream. I also do not think they are mutually exclusive.

And yes, when I was sharing my $YHOO thoughts at $14-$16, and begin to see it play out as I expected, (which btw, I do not subscribe to the camp that gives credit to Ms. Meyer for $YHOO recent run-up,) I’m happy about it. (I don’t recall taking victory laps, but it definitely feels good.)

I follow people who add value to my stream. I wish there were many more like LT, (especially when/if you portray yourself as posting live trades,) he is definitely one of the best. I do however find value in many other people who have different styles as well.

As they say, “suum cuique” or “to each is own”.

- MicroFundy

Posted in Uncategorized | 10 Comments

10b5-1 plans and Insider “not” Trading

After $NLFX & CEO Reed Hastings received a Wells notice from the SEC regarding his Facebook post, I’m sure most people today are focusing on the SEC’s “Reg FD”. (For a good summary and read see @kiddynamiteblog‘s post here –  ”Netflix, Social Media, and Regulation Fair Disclosure“.)

I decided to vent a little bit about another SEC Rule – 10b5-1.

If I were an executive of a publicly traded company, no matter on how great I thought the prospects of the company was, I would diversify my holdings. You don’t want to have all your financial capital tied to one company, especially if your human capital (future employment earnings) is relying on that same firm (See Lehman, Enron etc).

It typically doesn’t bother me much when I see “insider selling” of a company which I own equity in. Why would I expect executives to keep all their money tied up in one company?

When executive sell is a whole other story. Most executives are privy to insider information. To this point the SEC created the rule 10b5-1. Basically, it allows an executive, which enters a prearranged selling program, to sell even if he is privy to insider information on the date of the sale. Since it was a predetermined & irrevocable sale, it is not considered a sale based on this insider information.

Let’s take look at Pandora ($P). The company released horrible numbers this week. Executives obviously knew about it the days leading up to it, but because the following executives sold under 10b5-1 plans, they were able to sell at much higher prices.

On 12/3/12,

  • John Trumble (Chief Revenue Officer) exercised and sold 25,000 shares at $8.9029.
  • Thomas Conrad (CTO) exercised and sold 38,096 shares at $8.9034.
  • Steven Cakebread (CFO) exercised and sold 40,000 shares at $8.903.

The cost of exercising these shares was $0.16 for Messrs. Trumble & Conrad, and $0.71 for Mr. Cakebread. All the options had over 6 years till expiration, and while Mr. Conrad has another 39,800 shares, Messrs. Trumble & Cakebread were left with none.

The $8.90 selling price is over 12% higher than where the stock currently trades (just a few days later).

Having said all that, the sales were legal, and I don’t blame the executives for selling one bit - especially since they went into this agreement months ago.

I do however have an issue with the fact that – although they officially have to be irrevocable - if the trades do get canceled, the executives can not be charged with insider trading, because they didn’t execute a trade!

Imagine for a minute $P was going to come out with great numbers & guidance. Shouldn’t canceling the above trades based on that information be considered illegal?

Either way, if I owned any $P shares, I would sell it anyway I could too.

- MicroFundy

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Buybacks vs Dividends

With all the recent rage about special dividends due to the Fiscal Cliff, I figured now would be a good time to opine on the longtime debate Buybacks or Dividends.

Most Dividend fans point to empirical evidence, while Buyback fans favor theory (how boring!). It is not only hard to argue with either side, I think – although they arrive at different conclusions – they are both correct.

When companies are flush with cash, and therefore announce massive buybacks, it is typically done at a time when the company is doing best and the stock price is the highest. This is the reason most empirical data shows the buybacks are inferior. (Think $MSFT $CSCO $BBY etc.)

The advantage of paying dividends is that they are done systematically (for the most part) and usually quarterly. There is no regard to the fluctuation of the cash position or the company’s stock price.

Theoretically however, buybacks (in most cases) make more sense. They aren’t double taxed like dividends, so the net returns to shareholders are higher. Assuming the company is undervalued (trading under their book value, or ROIC > WACC), buybacks increase the value of the company to the remaining shareholders. Dividends, on the other hand – although shareholders receive cash from the company – it comes out of the company’s balance sheet, and the stock price automatically reflects that by going “ex-dividend”.

So both arguments are right. If a company is holding “extra” cash (because of good business performance, (This is an important point – think $YHOO now vs $CSCO in the past) and has no place to reinvest the money to earn the same return as the rest of the business) then they should pay higher dividends or do a special dividend.

On the other hand, if you’re talking about REGULAR – recurring payments, (or when you have a company that received their ”extra” cash from outside sources) then I believe, IF the company’s return on invested capital is higher than their cost of attaining that capital, or the company is trading at a discount to its book value – buybacks are preferable.

I would NOT (only) do the buybacks at times when the company’s cash balance gets bloated, I would do them daily/weekly/monthly/quarterly. They should be done systematically just as dividends would be. So let’s say XYZ corp has $400M to return to shareholders annually, the same way dividends would probably be $100M each quarter (regardless of stock price), switch it to buybacks and buyback ~$1.6M each trading day (or ~$7.7M each week) systematically etc. This way, you’re taking the stock price and cash balance out of the picture.

Based on my beliefs, most of the corporations that I follow do the exact opposite of what they should! Most companies pay regular dividends and when they have ”extra” cash, they announce massive buybacks. It should be the exact opposite! Have a recurring / systematic buyback, and when you have the “extra” cash – empirically this has been the worst time to do buybacks – pay a one time dividend.

- MicroFundy

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