The real Bull / Bear case on Apple, Inc.

DCF Basics. Why Discount Future Cash Flows?

One of the principals of Fundamental Analysis is called “DCF“ or “Discounted Cash Flow (Analysis)”.

An asset should be worth the money it will pay you over its lifetime. For example, a 5yr – 5% annual Bond is straightforward. You know (assuming no credit risks) you’ll receive a payment annually for the next 5 years, and then at the end of the 5th year, you’ll receive the last interest payment as well as your principal back. So let’s say you put in $10k, you’re receiving 5% or $500 each year, and then at the end of the 5th year, you’re getting the last $500 as well as the “original” $10k.

Now, although you are getting $12,500 in total, you will never pay $12,500 for those cash flows today. Because there are many risks associated with you receiving these cash flows. There’s Credit Risk, (will the company / Government / Municipality have the ability (or even willingness) to pay you.) Interest rate risk (The higher interest rates go, bond prices will decline (all else equal), etc. You therefore have to “discount” any money that you WILL receive. The rate that you will discount the cash flows is called the “discount rate”. This rate should be comprised of ALL of the risks associated with receiving the cash flows, added to the Risk Free Rate (or RFR, for another post). So say you want to discount the above cash flows (5yr bond) using a 7% discount rate, you plug it in your faithful BAII and you’ll get today’s current Fair Value of the bond… = $9,179.96

The Discount Rate is an extremely crucial variable in the equation of finding the Fair Value of a security. In the above example if you were to change the Discount Rate to 3%, the current Fair Value would rise to $10,915.94.

Apple Inc.

Apple makes great products, they revolutionized industries, bankrupted (once powerful) companies, are directly responsible for thousands of jobs created… and lost (via @businessinsider). That’s all nice and dandy. However, when trying to value the company by discounting all of their future cash flows, the key questions are, How certain are you that those cash flows will be there? Do they have long term contracts with their “end” customers? Where did all the customers come from?” (RIMM? PALM? THEORETICALLY, they can leave to another company for a better product just as quick as they came.) Because Apple is a consumer based product company, the Discount Rate due to the RISKS associated with receiving those cash flows has to be much higher than most would assume.

Contrast this with companies in the Wireless Tower sector (AMT, CCI, SBAC). (They have not only benefited GREATLY from AAPL, but also from AAPL’s competitors. Sort of like selling the picks & shovels to the miners.) Their customers are behemoths (VZ, T, S etc), the average contract or lease term on their towers are approximately 7- 8 years, and they have built in price increases on most of these contracts (an average escalator of around 3.5% a year). While this money isn’t as guaranteed as a US Treasury Bond, it is in my opinion, definitely more certain than saying AAPL will sell 50M iPhones in 2017.

Even MSFT, a huge portion of their business comes from enterprise customers, with “built in”, deeper relationships. I would say that their cash flows (set aside for a minute, if they’re growing or shrinking) are much more stable and predictable than AAPL’s.

So when discounting these cash flows & estimates, it’s fine to say, you’ll EXPECT AAPL to generate $50B in Free Cash Flow in FY15 – but the discount rate used to bring the value of that money back to today has to be a lot higher than what most people would think. Additionally, this discounting discount is amplified by the larger the growth rate, and the further out in time you go. Their 2020 cash flows for example, would have to be discounted for more years, and the discount rate has to be increased the further out you go, simply because the visibility will naturally decrease.

So what’s the Bull Case? Read David Einhorn’s Q1 letter via @marketfolly – he rightfully points out that AAPL’s growth rate is tremendous, and that its earnings multiple is less than the markets etc. but most of his points say nothing to the risks of their future earnings & cash flows.
What he does say however, is that (he believes) “AAPL is a software company”, and to me that’s the crucial point of his bullish thesis. As a software company with recurring revenues, sticky customers etc. you would have a lower discount rate.

Bottom line, unless you’re a fortune teller, every company’s “expected” Cash Flows have to be discounted by a different amount. The more visibly, stability, certainty etc.. the less they’ll have to be discounted. The more uncertainty or issues the company may have in attaining those cash flows, the higher the discount rate.

- MicroFundy

This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

10 Responses to The real Bull / Bear case on Apple, Inc.

  1. Did you actually model this out and if so, what did you use for the discount rate? If not, would you suggest using CAPM and an adjusted beta to account for the risk, or how would you determine an “appropriate rate”? Also, how do you tackle the TV growth rate or do you use an exit multiple? Beautifully written piece, by the way.

  2. microfundy says:

    No, i didn’t create a model for it. I wish i knew the answer to how to determine the discount rate. It’s by far the most difficult input to almost all DCF models, and unfortunately the hardest.
    If i were to model AAPL i would probably not include TV, as it has never been officially announced, and just keep it as an additional “upside potential”.

    • My most sincere apologies – I actually meant terminal value growth rate. It took me the longest time to figure out what you meant by lacking an announcement.

      I agree with both your points; Apple TV should be reserved for “upside potential” and the discount rate is certainly one of the most subjective and difficult parts of a DCF. I’m currently modeling AAPL and I’m thinking of doing a normal regression analysis to find beta then adding a risk premium and running it thru CAPM. I’ll have to add an extended sensitivity analysis to see how drastic the changes are between discount rates but that’s the best idea I have at the moment. I’ve been using historical EV/EBITDA as my exit multiple for the terminal value; any other suggestions?

  3. microfundy says:

    Makes sense. I would however note that historically AAPL was awarded higher multiples because of its higher growth rates.

  4. steven ricks says:

    actually this makes little sense at all, the way to value a company is cash on the balance sheet + cash flow.. We know today Apple has $117 per share in cash about to be $130 per share when they report.. 1 year from now they will have $180 per share in cash, even if they never earn another dime they will sit on $180 per share in cash.. That alone is worth 4X considering it goes nowhere and draws interest for ever, as long as the company is cash flow positive which of course it will be.. So minimum the stock goes to $720 within a year and that is assuming it is just cash flow positive and can barely make any profit and it will trade at 4X cash.

    So as long as they keep staking up cash on the balance sheet at a rate of $50 per year which implies -0- growth from todays current levels the stock will go up $200 per year minimum!

    Watch and Learn!

  5. Pingback: Know both sides of the trade | MicroFundy

  6. Pingback: iPhone 5: Apple’s inflection point | MicroFundy

  7. Pingback: Mobile Wars | MicroFundy

  8. Pingback: Follow Up On 2012′s Posts | MicroFundy

  9. Pingback: The Amazon Dilemma | MicroFundy

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s